Final Paper: Interpretting the Chinese Room through Qualia
1) I will explore Searle’s Chinese Room in terms of qualia, argue for the elimination of qualia, and address the question of machine personhood without qualia.
2) I believe Searle supports qualia, but I need to do more work to find exactly who and how they argue towards qualia.
3) Possible Sources
Searle, J., 1980, ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’ — presents the Chinese Room
Block, N. 1980 “Troubles with Functionalism” — presents the billion Chinese thought experiment
Dennet 1999, The Zombic Hunch: Extinction of an Intuition — argues against the notion of zombies
Chalmers 1996, “The conscious mind” — Argues that the Chinese Room should be considered in terms of consciousness and qualia. Gives thought experiments arguing against qualia in humans but in no other systems. Discusses zombies.
Nagel, Thomas. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” — discusses “what-it’s-likeness”
April 24, 2008 at 3:54 am
There are certainly some interesting things to say about chinese room argument and qualia, but I’m not sure what your thesis is. “arguing for the elimination of qualia” could mean different things–is it irrelevant to Searle’s argument (which it would seem to be, unless you can show that understanding or intentionality involves qualia). But what if you can point to qualia in this case–there is something it is like to manipulate the chinese symbols, it is just not relevant to function, or more gnerally that qualia are irrelevant to function. Or do you want to make a stronger claim that qualia don’t exit at all, and or/ do not need to be explained by cognitive neuroscience or philosophy?
As for the functionalism and qualia debate, you should look at Frank Jackson’s paper, and the example with Mary having facts about red and seeing red as a qualia.
Also, if you pursue the functionalist line, bear in mind that your need to do some work to connect this to the Chinese room, as it is not obvious.